IS DIOGENIANUS (APUD EUS., PRÆP. EV. VI 8) A SOURCE FOR CHRYSIPPUS’ REPLY TO THE IDLE ARGUMENT?¹

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Resumo: Este texto avalia o testemunho de Diogeniano (apud Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) como fonte para a resposta de Crisipo a uma objeção contra o determinismo estoico. Sustento que a objeção em questão guarda relações com o Argumento Preguiçoso como reportado por Cicero e Orígenes, mas, diferentemente deste, lida com as noções de “aquilo que depende de nós” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς), “aquilo que procede de nós” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν) e com a questão da imputabilidade.

Palavras-chave: Crisipo; Argumento Preguiçoso; “o que depende de nós” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς); “o que procede de nós” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν); imputabilidade.

Abstract: This text analyzes Diogenianus’ testimony (apud Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to an objection leveled against Stoic Fate-determinism. I argue that the objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony bears relation to the Idle Argument as reported by both Cicero and Origen but, unlike the Idle Argument, deals with the notions of “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς), “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν), and the issue of accountability.

Keywords: Chrysippus; Idle Argument; “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς); “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν); accountability.

¹ I would like here to thank everyone with whom I discussed previous versions of this article in March 2012 in the I Colóquio de Filosofia Antiga UFRGS/UFPR (organized by Vivianne de Castilho Moreira, Inara Zanuzzi, Licio Lobo, Raphael Zillig, and Priscilla Tesch Spinelli), and at a meeting of the Projeto Temático FAPESP “Filosofia Grega Clássica” (directed by Marco Zingano) at the University of São Paulo in August 2012, especially M.M. McCabe (King’s College London).

Susanne Bobzien (1998) uses Diogenianus’ testimony (in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica VI 8) alongside with that of Cicero (De Fato 28-30) and Origen (Contra Celsum II 20) as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to the Idle Argument (ἀργὸς λόγος, ignava ratio). In so doing, I believe she overlooks some important peculiarities of Diogenianus’ testimony. In what follows, I shall argue that Diogenianus bears witness to Chrysippus’ reply to a different argument, one which, although related to the Idle Argument, deals specifically with the notions of “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ᾿ ἡμᾶς) and “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν), as well as with the issue of accountability and the ascription of praise and blame, all of which are remarkably absent from both Cicero and Origen.

I

Cicero (Fat. 28-29) and Origen (Cels. 150.13-17) report the Idle Argument in a very similar manner:

εἰ εἵμαρταί σοι ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐὰν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τόν ἰατρόν ἐὰν τε μὴ εἰσαγάγῃς, ἀναστήσῃ· αὐτὰ καὶ εἰ εἵμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστήσῃ ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐὰν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τόν ἰατρόν ἐὰν τε μὴ εἰσαγάγῃς, ὁκὺ ἀναστήσῃ· ἤτοι δὲ εἵμαρταί σοι ἀναστήσῃ ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἢ εἵμαρται σοι μὴ ἀναστήσῃ· μάτην ἄρα εἰσάγεις τόν ἰατρόν.

si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, convalesces; item si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, non convalesces; et alterutrum fatum est; medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet.

2 Pagination as in Koetschau (1899).
If it is fated for you to recover from this disease, then you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not; similarly, if it is fated for you not to recover from this disease, then you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not. But one or the other is fated; so there is no point in calling in a doctor (trans. Sharples).

From their testimony one can easily extract the following schematization:

P1 If it is fated that you will p, then you will p whether or not you q.
P2 If it is fated that you will not p, then you will not p whether or not you q.
P3 Either it is fated that you will p or it is fated that you will not p.
C Therefore, it is idle to q.

As is evident from the conclusion, what is at stake is the futility of q—and the futility of q in the conclusion is derived from the futility of q in the consequents of P1 and P2, where it is at stake in quite different ways. In P1, the consequent “you will p whether or not you q” means “you will p even if you don’t q,” that is, your q-ing is not a necessary condition of your p-ing, or, alternatively, “it is not the case that (if you do not q, then you will not p).” In P2, on the other hand, the consequent “you will not p whether or not you q” means “you will not p even if you q,” that is, your q-ing is not sufficient to bring about your p-ing, or, alternatively, “it is not the case that (if you q, then you will p).” Thus, given that the argument has roughly the form of a constructive dilemma, what is meant by “it is idle for you to q” in the conclusion must be “it is not the case that ((if you q, then you will p) and (if you don’t q, then you will not p)).”

Cicero (Fat. 30) gives what seems to be a direct quotation from Chrysippus in reply to the argument:

3 The following is a valid form: \((p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p))\).\((\neg q \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p))\).\((p \lor \neg p) \rightarrow \neg ((q \rightarrow p) \land (\neg q \rightarrow \neg p))\). One may also think of substituting (Chrysippean) strict implication for (Philonian) material implication.
“quaedam enim sunt,” inquit, “in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata; simplex est, ‘Morietur illo die Socrates’; huic, sive quid fecerit sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. at si ita fatum sit, ‘Nascetur Oedipus Laio,’ non poterit dici ‘sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit’; copulata enim res est et confatalis.”

“For,” he says, “there are some cases in things that are simple, others complex. A case of what is simple is ‘Socrates will die on that day’; whether he does anything or not, there is a fixed day for his death. But if it is fated that ‘Oedipus will be born to Laius,’ one will not be able to say ‘whether Laius has slept with a woman or not’; the matter is complex and co-fated” (trans. Sharples).

The example of a simple event has puzzled many interpreters. Where one would expect “Morietur Socrates” (“Socrates will die”), one finds instead “Morietur illo die Socrates” (“Socrates will die on that day”)—and it is in the very least difficult to see how that event could fail to be fated along with the causes leading to it.

David Sedley (1993) has proposed the following interpretation. While recognizing that “the route to Socrates’ death is just as fated as the event itself,” and taking into account Socrates’ prophetic dream (in Plato, Crito 44ab, cited in Cicero, De Divinatione I 52) while in prison that he would die on the third day (316), he states that

“there is not just a single-stranded causal chain leading from Socrates’ birth to his death as a result of drinking hemlock, but one which repeatedly breaches out into hypothetical alternative strands, such as Socrates’ escaping from prison but thereafter being re-arrested, or falling ill in flight, or whatever, and thus dying on that very same day on which he in actuality drank the hemlock (317, his emphasis).”

Susanne Bobzien (1998) has criticized Sedley’s interpretation along the following lines: in her terms, Sedley takes simple occurrents to be occurrents which obtain in all possible worlds, while there are non-actual possible worlds in which different actions lead to the same outcome. Thus, she claims,
“On this reading of the Cicero passage, there is no criterion that helps to distinguish between what is a simple occurrent, what a conjoined one, apart from the fact that the divine intelligence determines—more or less randomly as far as human knowledge is concerned—that some are simple, others conjoined... Instead of being an argument against idleness, Chrysippus’ answer on this interpretation seems rather to open the door for excuses of the naïve fatalist kind: why should I call the doctor, it may well be fated simply that I will die from this disease anyway (218-9, her emphases).”

She then presents two alternative proposals as to how one should read the passage—and there is simply no way of squaring her proposals with Socrates’ prophetic dream or, for that matter, with Cicero’s text as it stands. In effect, she claims (219-20) that either (a) there are no examples whatsoever to be given of simple occurrents, since everything is always fated along with something else in reality (on which assumption Cicero made up the example “from scratch”), or (b) the original example was not “Socrates will die on this day” but rather “Socrates will die” or “you will die” (understood as a necessary consequence of Socrates’ (or the person’s) mortal nature), and was modified by either Cicero or his source.

There may be a way out of the difficulty, however. It may be the case that simplicia and copulata refer not to events or states of affairs themselves but to more or less precise descriptions of events or states of affairs. On this reading, simplicia are more general descriptions of events or states of affairs that admit being coupled (in the sense of, as far as the description goes, not being contradictory) with descriptions of a number of antecedent or concomitant events or states of affairs. This would allow for the fact that everything is always fated along with something else (or even everything else) in reality while making room for more general descriptions of events or states of affairs which may intelligibly be put to use in the case of non-conditional predictions such as Socrates’ prophetic dream (see below, p. 360, on copulata and conditional prophecies).

On this reading, Chrysippus’ reply would consist in pointing out that P1 and P2 are true only of very general descriptions of events or states of affairs, while any account in more precise terms—one which entails that ((if you q, then you will p) and (if you don’t q, then you will not p))—allows no room for the addition of “whether or not you q”. Thus, when Cicero says (Fat. 30),

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“If someone had said, “Milo will wrestle in the Olympic games,” and someone else answered, “So, whether he has an opponent or not, he will wrestle,” he would be wrong, for “he will wrestle” is complex (trans. Sharples),

his point is that, as far as it goes, the description “he will wrestle” entails Milo’s having an opponent, which not only is a necessary condition of the match, but is also sufficient to bring it about under the circumstances (when, say, everything else is ready and the only thing missing is the opponent).

II

With that in mind, I would now like to turn to Diogenianus’ testimony. The chapter as a whole (Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) can be divided into three sections of roughly equal length ([A]: 321.3-323.6; [B]: 323.8-325.24; [C]: 325.26-328.4), separated by brief remarks introduced by Eusebius (323.7: καὶ μεθ᾿ ε councill; 325.5: τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει, “In the sequence he adds”). As one can gather from the following chapter (VI 9), where Eusebius excerpts from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De Fato (chs. 3-6, 8-9, 11-12, and 18-19), Eusebius sometimes skips over or paraphrases portions of text without any explicit advertence to that effect, but never otherwise tampers with his source.

In [A] Diogenianus argues that the Homeric quotations adduced by Chrysippus in Book I of his work On Fate in order to show that everything is subsumed under Necessity and Fate (τὸ [...] πάνθ᾿ υπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κατειλῆθαι, 321.5-6) are not sufficient to establish that thesis, which in addition (always according to Diogenianus) conflicts with the Homeric quotations adduced by Chrysippus in Book II of the same work in order to establish that many things also depend on us (τὸ καὶ παρ’ ἡμᾶς

5 For instance, 331.2-6 in Eusebius is a paraphrase of 170.1-9 in Alexander, and 332.1-9 in Eusebius is an assemblage of 172.19-21, 25-26, 172.30-173.3, and 173.8-10 in Alexander.

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πολλά γίνεσθαι, 321.16-17). In [B] Diogenianus both reports Chrysippus’ etymologies of Fate and related notions and criticizes (what he claims to be) Chrysippus’ use thereof. And, finally, in [C] Diogenianus reports and criticizes Chrysippus’ reply to an objection leveled against Stoic Fate-determinism. The latter section will be our focus in what follows; below, original and translation of 325.26-327.12:

παρ’ ἡμᾶς τῷ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην, εἰ γε καθ’ εἰμαρμένην μὲν ἐκάκιμα καλέν προελήφθεν ὡσα καὶ ἐκάκιμων ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκόντων πάντως γίνεται, παρ’ ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃσα ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔρχεται ἡ παρὰ τὸ ἀμελέν καὶ ῥήθουμεν ὡσκ ἐπιπελεῖται, ἐὰν τοῖνυν ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἐμὲ θοιμάτων φιλάττειν ἐκεῖνο σφύγυται καὶ 25 ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι τῇ γυναικὶ πλησίαζεν τὰ τέκνα γένηται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι φεύγειν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ μὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀνδρείως φυλάττεσθαι πῶς τὸ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην ἐνταῦθα σωθήσεται; εἴ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ εἰκόνην ταῦτα συμβαίνει, παρ’ ἡμᾶς ὡσκ ἄν λέγω συμβαίνειν, εἰ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ὡσκ ἂν καθ’ εἰκόνην δηλαδή, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύναται συνδραμεῖν ταῦτα ἄλλως. ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἡμᾶς μὲν ἄσται, φησὶ, 5 περιειλημμένου μέντοι τοῦ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης καὶ πῶς, εἰσπούλτειν; εἰ γε καὶ τὸ φιλάττειν θοιμάτων καὶ τὸ μὴ φιλάττειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξωσιας ἐγένετο τῆς ἔμης, ὥστε γὰρ καὶ τὸ σφέσθαι ταῦτα δηλοῦτι κύριος ἄν εἴην ἐγώ. καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς διαστολῆς, ἢν ποιέται Χρύσιππος, δῆλον γίνεται τὸ ἀπαλλάττομα τῆς εἰμαρμένης τὴν παρ’ ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. καθεῖ- 10 μαρται γὰρ, φησὶ, σωθῆσαι θοιμάτων, εἰ φιλάττειν αὐτὸ, καὶ παῖδας σεσθαι, εἰ καὶ σο βουλητῆς, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἄν ἐπισεβὰς τα ταυτών. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης προκατελημμένων ὡσκ ἄν ποτα ὑποτιμῆσει τοιαύταις χρησαμένα.

[325.26] He makes use of such demonstrations in On Fate Book I, but in Book II he tries to solve the absurdities that are taken to follow from the thesis that everything is necessitated, those which we set out [326.1] at the beginning, for instance, the suppression, for that reason, of the readiness to act that proceeds from our own selves and concerns blame, praise, and exhortation, and of everything that manifestly depends on our causation for its taking place. He says, then, in Book II that it is evident that many things proceed from us, and are no less fated along with the [5] administration of
the whole. He makes use of examples such as these: the garment's not being destroyed, he says, is not fated simply, but along with its being taken care of; this man's being saved from the enemy, along with his fleeing from the enemy; and having children, along with wanting to have intercourse with a woman. For, he says, if someone had said that Hegesarchus the boxer would come off from the match completely unscathed, it would be absurd if someone thought that Hegesarchus would wrestle with his arms down since it was fated for him to come off unscathed, because the one who made the assertion said so because of the man's extraordinary guard against the blows; and so it is also in the other cases. For many things cannot take place without our wanting them and bringing into play our most intense readiness and effort regarding them, since it is along with that, he says, that those are fated to take place. Here again one may wonder at the man's lack of consideration and appraisal both of the clear view of things and of the lack of logical consequence in his own arguments. For, I think, just as that which is called sweet happens to be most opposed to that which is called bitter, and black to white, and hot to cold, so also that which depends on us to that which takes place according to Fate, if one preconceives that which takes place according to Fate in such a way as to call it that which takes place in any event, whether we will it or not, and that which depends on us as that which comes to its fulfillment from our effort and activity, or depends on our carelessness and sluggishness not to come to its fulfillment. If, then, the garment's being preserved proceeds from our effort in taking care of it, and the children's being born proceeds from wanting to have intercourse with a woman, and not dying at the hands of the enemy proceeds from wanting to flee from them, and coming off unscathed from the match proceeds from wrestling courageously with the opponent and guarding oneself against the blows of his hands, how is that which takes place according to Fate preserved in those cases? For, if everything takes place according to Fate, it is not possible to say that it depends on us to take place, and if it depends on us to take place, evidently it does not take place according to Fate, because those cannot square with one another. But these will
 depend on us, he says, \([5]\) as that which depends on us is
nevertheless comprehended under Fate. And how, I would say,
comprehended, if both taking care and not taking care of the
garment stem from our control? For, evidently, it is thus that
I rule over its being preserved. And from this distinction that
Chrysippus makes it becomes evident that causation that is
dependent on us dissolves Fate. For, he says, \([10]\) the garment
is fated to be preserved if you take care of it, and the children
are fated to be born if you want to have intercourse with a
woman, otherwise none of these things will happen. But in
the case of that which is from the very outset subsumed under
Fate we should make use of no such pleadings.

The objection addressed by Chrysippus in \([C]\) is not reported in the
text, and its precise content is open to question. When Diogenianus says that
in Book II of his work \textit{On Fate} Chrysippus tries to solve the absurdities that
are taken to follow from the thesis that everything is necessitated \((\text{ἐν [...]} \ τῷ
dευτέρῳ λύειν πειρᾶται τὰ ἀκολουθεῖν δοκοῦντα ἄτοπα τῷ λόγῳ τῷ
πάντα κατηναγκάσθαι λέγοντι, 325.27-28) and gives as an example the
following difficulty,

\[\text{oίων τὸ ἀναιρεῖσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν}
προθυμίαν περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπάς
καὶ πανθ’ ὅσα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν γιγνόμενα
φαίνεται,}\]

for instance, the suppression, for that reason, of the readiness
to act that proceeds from our own selves and concerns blame,
praise, and exhortation, and of everything that manifestly
depends on our causation for its taking place \((326.1-3),\)

Bobzien (1998) claims that the difficulty consists simply in the fact
that his theory “has been accused of destroying human readiness to act”
\((209).\) Her claim to that effect depends in part on her seeing προθυμία, or
readiness to act, simply as the opposite of ἀργία, or idleness, and therefore
on her seeing the objection addressed by Chrysippus in Diogenianus as
identical to that of the Idle Argument as reported in Cicero, where the
argument is said to be rightly so called because “if we obeyed it we would do
nothing at all in life” \((\text{cui si pareamus nihil omnino agamus in vita, 28})\) and
“all activity would be removed from life” (omnis e vita tolletur actio, 29); but her reduction of the difficulty to the issue of readiness to act depends also on her previous claim (181) to the effect that

Chrysippus’ refutation [of the Idle Argument] was countered, in a standard way, by pointing out that it destroys that which depends on us; but note that that which depends on us does not feature at all in any of the reports of the Idle Argument.

“That which depends on us” is Bobzien’s rendering of τὸ παρ᾿ ἡμᾶς, and what she says is true of portions of Diogenianus’ text such as 326.16-327.4 (on which, see below, p. 355-356). However, one could express some doubts as to her reading of the whole of Diogenianus’ text in [C]. First of all, Diogenianus explicitly says that the objection addressed by Chrysippus in his report concerns not only προθυμία, “readiness to act,” but ἡ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμία περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἕπαινους καὶ προτροπάς, “the readiness to act that proceeds from our own selves and concerns blame, praise, and exhortation.” Surely it may well be the case that the terms he uses to frame the objection are his own—and, in effect, there is a striking parallel in the use of προθυμία (or its cognate verb προθυμεῖσθαι), ἡ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, and παρά + accusative in the sense of “dependent on” in Book XX of Epicurus’ work On Nature, lines 48-53:6

“[The determinist] will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which in some cases the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who are eager to do something dependent on force. And the intellect will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way as

6 Text and lineation as in Sedley (1983).
proceeding from our own selves but without being eager to
(trans. Sedley, slightly altered).”

According to Sedley’s commentary on the passage (1983, 28-9),
Epicurus is here attempting to refute the determinist position by showing
that his adversary cannot distinguish between necessitated and unnecessitated
elements in an action, in such a way that he has nothing to say both (a) in
cases in which a person is eager to do something that goes against what is
forced upon her (e.g., cases in which one aims for impossibilities) and (b) in
cases in which something that goes against what the person is eager to do is
forced upon her (e.g., cases in which one chooses the lesser evil). Note the
terms used: in (a) our προθυμία contrasts with that which takes place παρὰ
βίαν (and, presumably, not παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς); in (b) the fact that that which takes
place proceeds in some way from our own selves (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πως) contrasts with our προθυμία. This being so, Ἡ ἣμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμία περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπάς would seem to refer to the
sort of convergence between an agent’s being eager to perform his action and
his action’s effectively proceeding from his own self that is at stake in one’s
full accountability for what one does.7 On this assumption, Diogenianus
(who, against what Eusebius says at the heading of Praep. Ev. VI 8, is an
Epicurean: see Praep. Ev. IV 3 170.23-25) could here be framing the objection
in terms that are peculiar to his philosophical persuasion, and quite alien to
the original formulation of the objection, with a view to preparing his own
objection in 326.16-327.4—but, as we shall see, not only his formulation
apprehends quite well what is at stake in the original objection, but also some
of the same notions and terms recur in passages that explicitly report
Chrysippus’ positions both in Diogenianus (see below on ἐξ ἡμῶν in 326.3-4
and on παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς in 321.16-17 and 327.4-5, as well as on the ascription of
praise and blame) and in other authors (see below, p. 360-362, on Gellius).

In what follows, it will be essential to take notice of the use of φησίν
(“he says”) in 326.3, 6, 9, and 327.4, 10, which detaches what can be

7 Possibly, the καὶ ἐν καὶ πάντῃ ἃ ἐν παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν γεγονόμενα φαίνεται (“and of
everything that manifestly depends on our causation for its taking place”, 326.2-3) is expository, in
such a way that such convergence between an agent’s being eager to perform his action and his action’s
effectively proceeding from his own self is equivalent to his action’s depending on him (i.e., to its taking
place παρ’ αὐτόν).
attributed to Chrysippus in Diogenianus’ testimony from what constitutes Diogenianus’ own objection to Chrysippus’ reply to the original objection.

In the immediate sequence to his presentation of the content of the objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony, Diogenianus reports that in Book II of his work On Fate Chrysippus says (φησίν, 326.3) that it is evident that many things proceed from us, but are no less fated along with the administration of the whole (τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔττον συγκαθεμάρθηαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὅλων διοίκησι, 326.3-4; the presence of διοίκησις τῶν ὅλων in the passage, together with the absence of αὐτῶν in the phrase ἐξ ἡμῶν, the presence of which is characteristic of Epicurus’ usage in Book XXV of his work On Nature (cf., e.g., ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, lines 8 and 52 Sedley; or οὐ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, lines 38, 41, 45, and 46 Sedley), may be further evidence (beyond the φησίν) that one is here dealing with the actual wording of Chrysippus’ On Fate). It must be noted that that corresponds very closely to what Diogenianus says earlier in the text (in [A]), namely that in Book II of his work On Fate Chrysippus wished to establish that many things, despite being fated, also depend on us (τὸ καὶ παρ’ ἡμᾶς πολλὰ γίνεσθαι, 321.16-17; see above, p. 348-349)—and Chrysippus’ conclusion in [C] is precisely that which depends on us (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς) is compatible with Fate (cf. ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐσται, φησὶ, περιελημενοῦ μέντοι τοῦ παρ’ ἡμᾶς υπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης, 327.4-5; notice the use of φησί). In effect, Chrysippus’ strategy in what follows consists, as we shall see in a moment, in establishing that under Fate many things proceed from us (i.e., are ἐξ ἡμῶν) in order to establish that under Fate many things depend on us (i.e., take place παρ’ ἡμᾶς).

With a view to that, Chrysippus adduces four examples of outcomes that, despite being fated, nevertheless proceed from us (326.5-13). It must be noted that the examples are used by Chrysippus (cf. κέχρη ἐκ, 326.5, and the two occurrences of φησίν in 326.6 and 9) in order to show that many things proceed from us—and, correspondingly, when Diogenianus alludes to Chrysippus’ four examples in the course of formulating his own objection against Chrysippus’ reply to the original objection (in 326.16-327.4), he paraphrases the examples in terms of the outcome proceeding from one’s actions or desires (cf. the use of ἔκ in 326.24-327.1). Given that, and the fact that in the passage from Book XXV of Epicurus’ work On Nature quoted above one finds, as we have seen, a similar use of expressions, one could then stipulate that the objection addressed by Chrysippus was originally framed—
perhaps even by an Epicurean—in terms of an event’s not depending on us (i.e., of its not taking place παρ’ ἡμᾶς) by virtue of its not proceeding from us (i.e., of its not being ἐξ ἡμῶν), and that in 326.16-327.4 Diogenianus as an Epicurean opposes Chrysippus’ reply to the original objection on the grounds that the προλήψεις, or preconceptions, of Fate and τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς are incompatible, in such a way that (one is left to assume) Chrysippus, on Diogenianus’ view, does no more than alter the προλήψεις of Fate and τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς—which, in the eyes of an Epicurean, are adequately characterized in the Letter to Menoeceus⁸ (note the Epicurean vocabulary of proof in 326.16-327.4, especially προείληφεν, 326.21 [subject ἐς, 326.16] and ἀνεπιλόγιστον (τῶν ἐναργειῶν), 326.17: on ἐπιλογισμός as comparative appraisal in Epicureanism and its use in inferences, see Schofield (1996); on πρόληψεις as a criterion of truth in Epicureanism and its use in refutations, see Schofield (1980, 291-3), Sedley (1983, 27-8)).

Turning back to the examples, Chrysippus uses them to show that the outcome is not fated simply (οὐχ ἁπλῶς, 326.6) but along with one’s actions or desires (μετὰ + infinitive, 326.6-8, 15), which bring about the outcome (cf. διὰ τὴν [...] φυλακῆν (326.12-13) with LS 55A, where ἠχῶν is said to be δι’ ὁ by Chrysippus) and without which the outcome could not take place (μὴ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι χωρὶς, 326.14). That is a clear echo of Chrysippus’ distinction between simplicia and copulata in his reply to the Idle Argument in Cicero, and more noticeably so if one is alert to the equivalence between “the garment’s not being destroyed, he says, [...] is fated [...] along with its being taken care of” (τὸ [...] μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι, φησὶ, θοιμάτιον [...] καθείμαρτο [...] μετὰ τοῦ φυλάττεσθαι, 326.5-7; notice the use of φησι) and “the garment, he says, is fated to be preserved if you take care of it, [...] otherwise not” (καθείμαρται [...], φησί, σωθῆναι θοιμάτιον, εἰ φυλάττοις αὐτό [...] ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, 327.9-11; notice again the use of ἐν ὑ), which recalls our proposed reading of the non-futility of q for p as ((if q, then p) and (if not-q, then not-p)). On this context, however, as has already been pointed out, it serves the purpose of establishing that outcomes such that ((if q, then p) and (if not-q, then not-p)) proceed from us (i.e., are ἐξ

⁸ DL X 133: τὴν [...] ὡς τῶν δεσπότων ἐλεγείμην πάντων [...] ἐλεγείμην (add. Usener), “Fate [...] which is introduced by some as mistress of all things”; τὸ [...] παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ὃ καὶ τὸ μεμπτόν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πάνικαν, “that which depends on us, on which culpability and its opposite are naturally consequent, is without master.”
ἡμῶν) and, therefore, depend on us (i.e., take place παρ’ ἡμᾶς),9 which squares well with the thesis that the original objection addressed by Chrysippus deals not only with προθυμία, or “readiness to act,” but with ἡ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμία περὶ ψόγους τέ καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπάς, or “the readiness to act that proceeds from our own selves and concerns blame, praise, and exhortation.”

Finally, a (lack of) parallel between the Milo example in Cicero (Fat. 30) and the Hegesarchus example in Diogenianus (326.9-14) must be taken into account. Bobzien (1998, 214-17), assuming that Cicero and Diogenianus report the same reply to the same objection and depend ultimately on the same source, despite supposed alterations in the examples in Cicero, emphasizes the similar structure of the examples to the point of claiming that their philosophical point is the same. Sharples (1983, 181), however, notices that, if Milo, on one hand, will not compete unless he has an opponent (and, one may add, he will compete if he has an opponent), Hegesarchus, on the other, will not win unless he keeps his guard (and, one may add, he will win if he keeps his guard), and concludes: “Chrysippus must have made the same point in more than one passage with different examples and emphases”—which is dismissed as “unlikely” by Bobzien (214-15). However, it is plausible that Chrysippus made use of slightly different examples when dealing successively with two different objections—namely the Idle Argument in the first place, which has no direct connection to the topic of praise and blame, and then the original objection in Diogenianus’ testimony, which has. (Notice that one can be praised for keeping his guard and thus winning a match, but not for having an opponent and competing.)

The above considerations would then allow for the following conjectural schematization of the argument addressed by Chrysippus in Diogenianus’ testimony:

P1 One can only be praised or blamed for an outcome if the outcome depends on one.

P2 An outcome depends on one if, and only if, it proceeds from one.

9 On the basis of which one could perhaps ascribe to Chrysippus a definition of παρ’ ἡμᾶς in terms of ἐξ ἡμῶν (παρ’ ἡμᾶς =Df τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης) such as the definition of ἐφ’ ἡμῖν in terms of δι’ ἡμῶν (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν =Df τὸ δι’ ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης) in Nemesius’ De Natura Hominis 35 (cf. also the second hand in MSS B [Marcianus gr. 261] in Alexander’s De Fato 13 181.14, together with 182.3-4, 7-8).
P3 An outcome proceeds from one if, and only if, ((if one q’s, the outcome takes place) and (if one does not q, the outcome does not take place)).

P4 Under determinism it is not the case that ((if one q’s, the outcome takes place) and (if one does not q, the outcome does not take place)).

C Under determinism no one can be praised or blamed.

Note that P4 above is precisely the conclusion of the Idle Argument (see above, p. 345). Matters being such, Chrysippus could have drawn on his reply to the Idle Argument in order to establish that the objection in Diogenianus concerning τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν and τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς, as well as the ascription of praise and blame, also fails.

III

The above results may be corroborated by the following observations:

(i) Homer, Odyssey

In 321.16-322.4 (part of [A]), Diogenianus says that, in the course of establishing the thesis that, despite being fated, many things also depend on us, Chrysippus quotes two passages from Homer’s Odyssey, one dealing with the fate of Odysseus’ companions,

"αὐτοὶ γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὀλοντο"  

"They were destroyed by their own recklessness",  

(α 7, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

the other presenting Zeus’ reply to charges such as Aegisthus’ to the effect that the gods are to be held accountable for men’s misfortunes,

"ὦ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτίωνται.  
ἐξ ἡμέων γὰρ φασι κάκ’ ἐμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ  
σφήσιν ἀτασθαλίησιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσι."  

"Oh, for shame! How the mortals accuse us gods,  
for they say evils proceed from us, when it is they, rather,
who by their own recklessness win sorrow beyond what is due!"

(α 32-34, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

In the latter passage, Zeus implies that the gods are not to be held accountable for men’s misfortunes because men’s misfortunes do not proceed from the gods (cf. ἐξ ἡμέων, α 33); rather, as the immediate sequence of the passage makes clear, men’s misfortunes proceed but from themselves, in the sense that ((if one q’s, then the outcome ensues) and (if one does not q, then the outcome does not ensue)):

"ὡς καὶ νῦν Αἴγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον Ἀτρείδαο γῆμ᾿ ἄλοχον μνηστὴν, τὸν δ᾿ ἐκταν νοστήσαντα, εἰδὼς αἰπὺν ὀλέθρον, ἐπεὶ πρὸ ὁι ἐξας εἴμεξ, Ἐρμεῖαν πέμψαντις ἄσκοπουν Αργείπόντην, μητ᾿ αὐτὸν κτείνειν, μητε μνάασθαι ἀκοίτιν· ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέσταο τίς ἔσσεται Ατρείδαο […]"

"As now lately, beyond what was due, Aegisthus married the wife of Atreides, and murdered him on his homecoming, knowing it was steep ruin, for we had told him beforehand, having sent Hermes, the mighty watcher, Argeïphontes, not to kill the man, nor court his lady for marriage; for vengeance would come on him from Orestes, son of Atreides […]"

(α 35-40, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

Here it is said that if Aegisthus marries Clitemnestra and murders Agamemnon, then he will be killed by Orestes; and it is implied that if he does not marry Clitemnestra and murder Agamemnon, then he will not be killed by Orestes. The structure ((if q, then p) and (if not-q, then not-p)), however, becomes explicit in the following passage, which refers to Odysseus and his companions:

"τὰς εἰ μὲν κ᾿ ἀσινέας ἐὰς, νόστου τε μέδηαι,

10 Not attested, however, for Chrysippus in Diogenianus.
11 Also not attested for Chrysippus in Diogenianus.
καὶ κεν ἐπὶ εἰς Ἰθάκην, κακά πέρ πάσχοντες, ἱκοισθε·
eἵκοισθε·
εἰ δὲ κε σύνη, τὸ τοι τεκμαίρουμ’ ἄλεθρον
νηὶ τε, καὶ ἑταίροις [...]”

“Then, if you leave these unharmed and keep your mind in
homecoming,
you might all make your way to Ithaca, after much suffering;
but if you do harm them, then I testify to the destruction
of your ship and your companions [...]

(λ 109-112 = μ 137-140, trans. Lattimore, slightly altered)

One must here observe that the conditional form of both prophecies
(which is implicit in α 35-40 and becomes explicit in λ 109-112 = μ 137-140)
is of course not to be taken to imply that there are any real alternatives
available to the Homeric agent, only that his action is both a necessary
condition of the outcome and sufficient to bring it about under the
circumstances; on this assumption, if the action takes place, then the
outcome ensues; and, hypothetically, were not the action to take place, the
outcome would not ensue. (On Diogenianus’ criticism of Chrysippos’ stand
on conditional prophecies on the grounds that it introduces real alternatives
via its being ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, or up to us, to perform or not to perform the action
in the antecedent, see Eus., Praep. Ev. IV 3 172.2-5).

(ii) Gellius, Noctes Atticae VII 2
The use of παρ’ ηὑμᾶς in Stoicism is attested also in Aëtius (I 27 4).
However, it is in Gellius (Noctes Atticae VII 2) that such use is coupled with
32-34 and correlated with the issue of accountability. There, the Homeric
passage is preceded by a direct quotation from Chrysippos and a paraphrase
by Gellius (§§12-14):

διὸ καὶ υπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἴρηται·
’γνώσει δ’ ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήξατ’ ἔχοντας,
ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἑκάστοις παρ’ αὐτοὺς 13 γινομένων καὶ
καθ’ ἐρήμῳ αὐτῶν ἀμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων
καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ θέσιν.”

12 Except for ἐν τ’ αὐν (μ 138) in the place of καὶ κεν (λ 110).
“Propterea negat oportere ferri audique homines aut nequam aut ignavos et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et maleficio revincti sunt, perfugient ad fata necessitatem, tamquam in aliud fani asylum et, quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritate, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt. Primus autem hoc sapientissimus ille et antiquissimus poetarum dixit hisce versibus, etc.”

“Therefore it is said by the Pythagoreans, ‘You will learn that men’s sufferings are self-chosen,’ much to the effect that each one’s harms depend on one to take place, and that it is according to one’s impulse that one errs and is harmed, as well as according to one’s reasoning and stand.”

For this reason he denies that one should endure, and listen to, men who are either worthless or idle or harmful or rash, who, when bound fast in crime and evildoing, seek refuge in the necessity of Fate as in the asylum of a shrine and say that their wicked actions are to be attributed not to their recklessness, but to Fate. But the first to say this was the wisest and oldest of the poets in these verses, etc.”

Noctes Atticae VII 2 may be divided into seven sections: [A] (§§1-3), Latin paraphrase and Greek original of a definition of Fate from Chrysippus’ On Providence, Book IV; [B] (§§4-5), an objection to Chrysippus’ claim that everything takes place according to Fate; [C] (§§6-10), Chrysippus’ reply to [B]; [D] (§11), the cylinder analogy; [E] (§§12-13), quotation and paraphrase from Chrysippus (above); [F] (§14), quotation of 32-34, illustrating the point in [E]; [G] (§15), a fragment from Cicero’s On Fate.

Noctes Atticae VII 2 and Cicero, On Fate 40-43 are usually regarded as parallel testimonies to the same objection to Stoic Fate-determinism and to the same reply to the objection, illustrated by the same analogy.14 I think, however, that only [D] and [G] are parallel to Cicero, On Fate 40-43. In effect, the objection in Cicero purports to establish the incompatibility

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13 Following Hertz-Hosius (1903), who print αὐτούς (MS U [Urbina 309]), not ατος, the latter probably being a contamination from ἑκάστους.

14 Cf., e.g., Bobzien (1998, 242-71).
between everything taking place according to Fate and our assents and actions being up to us (Fat. 40), Chrysippus’ reply to it consisting in a distinction between types of causes such that one may say of a cylinder which, once pushed, rolls that the push is merely a principium motionis, while the cause properly so called is its volubilitas (Fat. 41-43). In Noctes Atticae VII 2 the incompatibility between omnia fato fieri and esse aliquid in nobis figures only in [G] (a fragment which does not form part of Cicero’s On Fate as it has come down to us), and the distinction between types of causes according to which, in the cylinder analogy, the push is initium praeципiantiae and the cause properly so called is formae volubilitas figures only in [D]. When, moreover, one is alert to the use of deinde (“then”) both at the beginning of §11 and at the beginning of §12 (thus detaching the cylinder analogy and the distinction between types of causes from the rest of the chapter), as well as to the fact both that the objection in [B] attempts to derive from the claim that everything takes place according to Fate the conclusion that one’s faults and offenses should be attributed not to one but to Fate (“Si Chrysippus […] fato putat omnia moveri et regi nec declinari transcendique posse agmina fati et volumina, peccata quoque hominum et delicta non suscensenda neque inducenda sunt ipsis voluntatisbusque eorum, sed necessitati cuidam et instantiae, quae oritur ex fato,” §5), and that the paraphrase in [E] accuses those who attribute their misdeeds not to themselves but to Fate (“Properterea negat oportere ferri audique homines aut nequam aut ignavos et nocentes et audaces, qui, cum in culpa et maleficio revincti sunt, perfugijunt ad fati necessitatem, tamquam in aliquod fani asylum et, quae pessime fecerunt, ea non suae temeritate, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt,” §13), the hypothesis becomes tenable that [B]–[C] and [E]–[F] constitute a sequence interrupted by [D]. On this reading, the objection discussed in [B]–[C] and [E]–[F] aims to establish not the incompatibility between everything taking place according to Fate and our assents and actions being up to us—such as (one is to assume) in [D], and explicitly in [G] and Cicero, On Fate 40-43, where the Latin esse in nobis/in nostra potestate seems to correspond to the Greek ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι—but, rather, that between everything taking place according to Fate and one’s misdeeds depending not on Fate but on one (notice παρ’ αὐτοὺς γινομένων, §13), Chrysippus’ reply to which is illustrated by α 32-34—such as in Diogenianus.
Finally, one must notice that it is no longer men’s misfortunes, but men’s misdeeds, that are now said to be evils dependent on men—which may well point to Chrysippus’ adaptation of the examples, in line with the thesis that only virtue is good and only vice is evil.

(iii) ps.-Plutarch, De Fato 574de

In contrasting his own philosophical persuasion to his opponents’ (who are presumably Stoic: ὁ [...] ἐναντίος <λόγος> [...] καθ’ εἰμαρμένην πάντα τίθεται, 574d), ps.-Plutarch (De Fato 574de) mentions in the same breath the Idle Argument, the Mower Argument, and ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος. To my knowledge, the sole conjecture regarding the latter has been proposed by Eduard Zeller (1923, III.1:171n.1), who takes it as “the argument against Fate” in the sense of an argument to the effect that man could render Fate vain through his actions; but it may as well be read as “the argument that makes all events or states of affairs dependent on Fate”—and both its placement side by side with the Idle Argument in the passage and the use of παρὰ + accusative square well with the results of our preceding analysis.

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Primary Works

15 Bobzien (1998, 189-91) takes the Idle Argument to be a development from the Mower Argument.
Secondary Works


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RECEBIDO: Novembro/2012
APROVADO: Dezembro/2012