Moral criticism and integrity: explaining the immorality of moralism
Resumo
Usually moralist behaviour and attitude are defined in terms of a very demanding obedience to moral principles or obligations, a kind of intransigence towards abiding by the moral rules and sternness of the moral condemnations. From an ethical point of view, moralism is considered a flaw or distortion in making moral considerations, in relation to precedence of moral aspects or to the appropriate moral scope. In this paper, assuming the possibility of a positive moralism, I criticize the limitations of the negative conception, and present a more comprehensive conception. According to this conception, moralism is described as a moral perspective based on the value integrity. I defend this conception can explain many characteristics we associate with both negative and positive moralism. Since moral criticism involves asking for justification and opening to excuses, I suggest the negative moralism is an objectionable moral attitude or behaviour, precisely, because it blocks or hinders the possibility of moral justification and excuse.Referências
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