THE SKEPTICS AND THEIR BELIEFS: SEXTUS EMPIRICUS'S APPARENT DUPLICITY

Abstract

From its early origins, skepticism has been the target of much criticism and attempts of refutation. One of the oldest, most recurring criticism is that the skeptic would be unable to act since, to do so, some measure of beliefs are necessary, and a skeptic is supposed to suspend judgment on all beliefs. The most common reply to this challenge is that the skeptic suspends judgment only as far as scientific or philosophic dogmas are concerned, yet preserving common-sense beliefs. This is not a satisfactory reply, for it relies on an insulation that is not actually found in the skeptic texts. A better reply is possible, however. After an exposition of Aenesidemus’s tropes, I intend to develop an interpretation of Sextus Empiricus according to which his beliefs would be based only on appearances, without recourse to judgments on them. A radical skepticism can thus be preserved, together with the capacity for acting.