Ética evolucionista: a diferença entre altruísmo e moralidade
Resumo
Autores que adotam a abordagem da ética evolucionista para explicar a conformação da psicologia humana costumam confundir altruísmo e moralidade, ignorando que a existência de comportamentos cooperativos e de punições contra indivíduos egoístas não depende da existência de juízos morais. No presente artigo, apresento argumentos extraídos de discussões entre cognitivistas e não-cognitivistas e resultados de estudos na área da Psicologia moral a fim de esclarecer a importância de distinguir os dois conceitos mencionados. Concluo que a compreensão das diferenças entre altruísmo e moralidade conduz à identificação das diversas capacidades intelectuais envolvidas nos julgamentos morais e é essencial para o projeto de averiguar se a capacidade para julgar moralmente é uma adaptação biológica.Referências
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